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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
DANNY BRENT CRISCOLA, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 16786 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Danny Brent Criscola, appeals from a 
conviction and judgment of Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance for Value in the Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Danny Brent Criscola, was charged with 
Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a felony in 
violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8(l)A, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1975 as amended. A jury found appellant guilty and 
he was sentenced to incarceration at the Utah State Prison for 
the indeterminate term as provided by law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and 
judgment rendered below and a remand to the Third Judicial 
District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At trial, the State alleged that appellant, Danny 
Brent Criscola, offered and sold for value one quarter ounce 
of cocaine to narcotics agents, Robert Powers and Steven 
Douglas Brown. Appellant took the stand and testified 
in his defense. Appellant testified that agents Powers 
and Brown were driving alongside the car which his brother, 
Robert Criscola, was driving. There were "a few other people 
in the car" and appellant was in the back seat. (T. 86, 87) 
Agent Powers motioned for Robert Criscola to roll down his window 
and a conversation took place. The agents said they were from 
Phoenix and were looking for a place to buy drinks over the 
bar. The agents were invited to go to a private club with 
appellant, his brother and their friends. The agents went 
to the private bar, and when the bar closed, Robert Criscola 
invited the agents to his home. Appellant rode in the agents' 
car to direct them to Robert's home. (T. 88) Drinks were 
served and a poker game was started at Robert's home. (T. 89) 
During the course of the evening, Robert Criscola, sold 
a half a gram of cocaine to Agent Powers (T.71,91). Appellant 
further testified that he was concerned about his brother's 
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dealings, especially in reference to the two agents (T.92). 
The agents asked Robert if he could get more cocaine for 
them. (T.92) Appellant testified that he was fearful that his 
brother was getting involved with questionable characters. 
(T.97) The agents had indicated to appellant that they were 
with an organization that was distributing drugs in Phoenix. 
(T.97). The agents also continued to lead the conversation 
to the subject of drugs (T .. 9 3) . Appellant testified that 
he was fearful for his brother because of the demanding, 
insisting attitude of the agents (T.98). Appellant told the 
agents to deal with him directly and explicity told them not 
to deal with his brother (T.97,74,52,42). Prior to that 
directive Agent Powers testified that his dealings had been 
with Robert Criscola (T.41). Appellant explained that the 
reason for telling the agents to deal with him was to "pull 
them off" his brother. His explanation for taking the risk 
of stepping between his brother and the two agents was that his 
younger brother, Robert, had never been in "trouble" before 
while appellant had been in prison before, was having marital 
and health problems and therefore felt he had less to lose 
(T.105,106). Appellant maintained throughout his testimony that his 
concern of the questionable character of the agents and his 
fear for his brother led him to intervene and accomodate 
the agent's requests for narcotics. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE 
SUBJECTIVE THEORY OF ENTRAPMENT, THE APPLICABLE 
LAW AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE, VIOLATED 
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The Constitution of the United States and the State of 
Utah both expressly prohibit any ex post facto law Article I, 
Section 10 of the United States Constitution provides: 
No state shall ... pass any bill of attainder, 
ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation 
of contracts. 
Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or any 
law impairing the obligation of contracts 
shall be passed. 
The above provisions are connnonly referred to as the 
ex post facto clause and was first given judicial interpretation 
in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798). In that case the United 
States Supreme Court was faced with a question of the 
retroactive application of a change in probate law by a state 
legislature. The Court noted two important factors in the 
application of the ex post facto clause. First, the clause 
applies primarily to criminal actions. Secondly, the nature 
of retroactive application applies to the time that the offense 
was alleged to have been connnitted. The Court in an often-
quoted passage described four situations that it considered to be 
exemplary of ex post facto laws; 
-4-
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I will state what laws I consider ex 
post facto within the words and intention 
of the prohibition. First 1 every law 
that makes an action done before the passing 
of the law; and which was innocent when done, 
criminal; and punishes such action. 
Second, every law that advocates a crime, or 
makes it greater than it was when committed. 
Third, every law that changes the punishment, 
and inflicts a greater punishment, than the 
law annexed to the crime when committed. 
Fourth, every law that alters the legal 
rules of evidence and receives less or 
different testimony than the law required 
at the time of the commission of the offense 
in order to convict the offender. All these 
and similar laws are manifestly unjust 
and oppressive. 3 Dall. 386, 390-391. 
In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 84 S.Ct. 1697 378 U.S. 347 (1964), 
the Supreme Court determined that since state legislatures 
are barred by the ex post facto clause from passing such a 
law, state courts are barred by the due process clause from 
achieving pr~cisely the same result by judicial construction. 
Thus the states cannot do by judicial interpretation what they 
cannot do legislatively. The trial court's failure to give 
an instruction on entrapment that was proper under this 
Court's decisions at the time that the offense was committed was 
in effect an ex post facto fact application of judicial 
decision which" ... makes an action done before the passing 
of the law; and which was innocent when done, criminal; and 
punishes such action." 
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The instruction offered by appellant at his trial was 
proper under prior decisions of this Court, 1 where the issue 
of entrapment permits a searching inquiry into the "conduct 
and motivations of both the officers and the defendant, including 
the past conduct of the defendant in committing similar crimes, 
and the general activities and character of defendant". 
State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 500 (Utah 1979), State v. Bridwell, 
566 P. 2d 1232 (1977), Somells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 
53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932). This inquiry is a subjective 
theory of entrapment and one which this Court followed until 
the decision in State v. Taylor, supra, where the entrapment 
statute was interpreted as requiring an objective test. 
1. Defendant's Instruction: 
For a peace officer to procure a person to ccmnit a crime, which 
he otherwise would not have corrmitted, for the purpose of apprehending and 
prosecuting him is entrapment. This is so discordant to the true function 
of law enforcem:nt which is the prevention, not the causation, of crime; 
and so repugnant to fundamental concepts of justice that the conviction 
of an accused under such circunstances will not be approved. When that issue 
is present, the question is whether the crime is the product of defendant's 
own intention and desire, or is the product of sane incitement or inducement 
by the peace officer. If the crime was in fact so instigated or induced 
by what the officer did that the latter's conduct was the generating cause 
which produced the crime, and without which it would not have been ccmnitted, 
the defendant should not be convicted. On the other hand, if the defendant's 
attitude of mind was such that he desired and intended to conmi.t the crime, 
the mere fact that an officer or someone else afforded him the opportunity 
to comnit it would not constitute entrapment which would be a defense to 
its comnission; and this would not be less true even though an undercover 
man went along with the defendant in the criminal plan and aided or 
encouraged him in it. 
If, after a consideration of all the evidence you have a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant, Damy Brent Criscola, may have been subject to 
entrapment as defined above, you must find him not guilty. 
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See also State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975), where 
the court said that the inquiry included one into defendant's 
"voluntary will and desire." Accord, State v. Pacheco, 369 
P.2d 494, 496 (Ut. 1962), State v. Perkins, 432 P.2d 50 (Ut. 1967). 
The court denied the use of appellant's instruction and instead 
used the state's instruction which is based on an objective 
theory. 2 
State v. Taylor, supra, was handed down August 7, 1979 
and the alleged offense in this case occurred in April of 1977. 
At that time the defens.e of entrapment involved a subjective 
test. Appellant Criscola would have been allowed to instruct 
the jury on the question of his subjective intent with respect 
to entrapment. After the Taylor decision, the focus changed 
and hence such an inquiry would not have been proper. A change, 
by court decision in an interpretation of a criminal statue 
which after the change, requires something "different" than the 
earlier law, is a violation of the Calder and Bouie principles, 
the appellant was entitled to a subjective theory of entrapment 
2. State's Instruction (no. 17): 
It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into comriitting the 
offense. Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed 
by or acting in co-operation with the officer induces the cc.mnission of an 
offense in order to obtain evidence of the corrmission for prosecution by 
rrethods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be ccmnitted by one 
not otherwise ready to corrmit it. Conduct merely affording a person an 
opportunity to comnit an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
This instruction quoted is the language of entrapment statute, Utah 
Code Ann. §76-2-303 (1953 as amended). This statute itself is now 
interpreted as requirin~ by legislative intent an objective inquiry. 
State v. Taylor, 599 P. d at 501. 
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instruction as such a focus was the law at the time the 
offense was committed. Application of an objective standard, 
which is what the law required after the commission of the offense 
in this case was an ex post facto judicial interpretation 
with respect to the appellant and hence the failure to instruct 
on the entrapment law in effect at the time of the commission 
of the offense violated appellant's constitutional right to 
Due Process of Law. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant contends that the trial court's refusal 
to submit his requested jury instruction on the subjective 
theory of entrapment, the applicable law at the time of the 
offense, was a violation of the constitutional prohibition 
against ex post facto laws and in violation of due process 
and therefore his conviction cannot stand. 
Respectfully submitted this~~~~-day of March, 1980. 
BRAD P. RICH 
Attorney for Appellant 
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